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SUMMARY 
A locally Lipschitz cooperative generalized game is described 
by its coalition worth function v defined on the set [ O f  1 I n  of 
generalized (or fuzzy) coalitions of n players. We assume that 
v is positively homogeneous and locally Lipschitz. We propose 
N the Clarke's generalized gradient av(c ) of v at the coalition 
cN = 1 , . . 1 of all players as a set of solutions, and we study 
its property. We point out that it coincides with the core when 
v is super-additive and to the Shapley value when v is smooth. 
We also represent cooperative fuzzy games as "action games", for 
which we define and prove a concept of equilibrium. 

Introduction 
We show in this paper how concepts of fuzzy sets and gener- 
alized gradients as well as viability theory allow to treat, in 
a unified way, several competing concepts of cooperative game 
theory and how to devise new models (called action games) which 
are dynamical and explain the formation of coalitions. 
Many concepts of solutions to a game with side-payments 
have been proposed: among them, the core and the Shapley value, 
which yield different outcomes. Many efforts have been made to 
obtain situations where some of these concepts coincide. Let us 
mention for instance the replicating procedure introduced by 
Debreu-Scarf (1 963) and Shapley (1953) and the use of continuum 
of players introduced by Aumann (1969). [See the books of Aumann- 
Shapley (1979) and Hildenbrand (1974) for further references.] 
In Aubin (1974a,b), we proposed the framework of 'fuzzy 
games' (games defined on a 'continuum of coalitions') for defining 
and comparing these concepts [see for instance Aubin (1979b, chs. 
1 11, 1 2 )  This paper deals with the same framework of fuzzy 
games. 
For games w i t h  side-payments w e  propose  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  
g r a d i e n t  av o f  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  worth f u n c t i o n  v  a s  a  set of  so lu -  
t i o n s  t o  a  l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  game. It  can  be regarded  a s  t h e  
s u b s e t  o f  'ma rg ina l  g a i n s '  t h a t  t h e  p l a y e r s  r e c e i v e  when t h e y  
j o i n  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  o f  a l l  p l a y e r s .  
W e  do  n o t  c l a i m  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  'good'  concep t  of  s o l u t i o n :  
w e  o n l y  p o i n t  o u t  t h a t  it ' u n i f i e s '  competing concep t s  o f  so lu -  
t i o n s .  
W e  c h a r a c t e r i z e  t h i s  set of  s o l u t i o n s  i n  s e v e r a l  i n s t a n c e s :  
it i s  t h e  c o r e  when t h e  game i s  supe r - add i t i ve ,  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  
Shapley v a l u e  when t h e  game i s  smooth. W e  c h a r a c t e r i z e  (some) 
s o l u t i o n s  when v  a r i s e s  from a  game d e s c r i b e d  i n  ' s t r a t e g i c '  ( o r  
' normal ' ) f  o m .  
What abou t  t h e  u s u a l  games? W e  proposed a  s i n g l e  concep t  
o f  s o l u t i o n .  S t i l l ,  t h e r e  a r e  s e v e r a l  ways t o  ex t end  a u s u a l  
game w i n t o  a  g e n e r a l i z e d  game ITW. Each e x t e n s i o n  p rocedure  IT 
N y i e l d s  a  set of  s o l u t i o n s  a( .rrv)(c ) t h a t  depends upon t h e  c h o i c e  
o f  IT. So, t h e  d i v e r s i t y  o f  t h e s e  s o l u t i o n  concep t s  r e s u l t s  from 
t h e  d i f f e r e n t  ways by which a  u s u a l  game i s  t r ans formed  t o  a 
g e n e r a l i z e d  game. 
W e  s h a l l  obse rve  t h a t  t h i s  concep t  o f  s o l u t i o n  does  n o t  
e x p l a i n  t h e  fo rmat ion  of  c o a l i t i o n s .  Then, t h e  second purpose  
of t h e  paper  i s  devoted  t o  a  r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  way f o r  modeling 
c o o p e r a t i v e  fuzzy  games a s  " a c t i o n  games". 
W e  assume t h a t  p l a y e r s  a c t  on t h e  environment by t r ans fo rming  
it and t h a t  w e  know t h e  law o f  t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  o f  each  fuzzy  co- 
a l i t i o n  of  p l a y e r s .  W e  a r e  l ook ing  f o r  e q u i l i b r i a ,  i .e . ,  a  fuzzy  
c o a l i t i o n  c and s t a t e s  x of  t h e  environment which are i n v a r i a n t  
by t h e  a c t i o n  o f  t h e  fuzzy  c o a l i t i o n  c. W e  prove  a  theorem of  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  a n  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  such a  game, an  e q u i l i b r i u m  which 
i s  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  set of  a dynamical  system i n  which c o a l i t i o n s  
of  p l a y e r s  can  be  regarded  a s  r e g u l a t i o n  c o n t r o l s .  
FUZZY GAMES: THE STATIC AND DYNAMICAIL 
POINTS OF VIEW 
J e a n - P i e r r e  Aubin 
Fuzzy C o a l i t i o n s  
W e  d e n o t e  by N t h e  se t  o f  t h e  n  p l a y e r s .  C o o p e r a t i v e  games 
are t h o s e  games t h a t  i n v o l v e  t h e  b e h a v i o r  o f  " c o a l i t i o n s " ,  
r e g a r d e d  as s u b s e t s  S  o f  t h e  "g rand  c o a l i t i o n "  N .  C o o p e r a t i v e  
f u z z y  games, c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  d o  i n v o l u e  f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n s ,  
r e g a r d e d  as f u z z y  s u b s e t s  o f  N.  
B e s i d e s  t h e  u s u a l  b e n e f i t s  g a i n e d  a t  u s i n g  f u z z y  s u b s e t s ,  
w e  have  t o  men t ion  t h a t  it i s  a l s o  t e c h n i c a l l y  advan tageous  
s i n c e  w e  " c o n v e x i f y "  i n  some s e n s e  t h e  discrete se t  T ( N )  
( o f  s u b s e t s  o f  N )  and  t h u s ,  u s e  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  a n a l y s i s .  
W e  reca l l  t h a t  w e  i d e n t i f y  t h e  se t  T(N) w i t h  t h e  s u b s e t  
{ o ,  1 )" o f  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n s  cS o f  s u b s e t s  S  d e f i n e d  
by 
( 1 )  c S ( i )  = 1 when i E  S and c ( i)  = 0 when i & S. S 
~ i n c e { 0 , 1 ) ~  i s  a s u b s e t  o f  R", w e  c a n  t a k e  i t s  convex h u l l ,  
which i s  t h e  cube  [0,1] ". 
The e l e m e n t s  c E [ 0 , 1 I n  are cal led f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n s .  They 
a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  any p l a y e r  i E N  i t s  r a t e s o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
c ( i )  E  [0 ,1I  i n  t h e  f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n  c. 
A player participates wholly to C when c(i) = 1, he does not 
participate at all when c(i) = 0, and he participates in a 
fuzzy manner when c(i) E ]0,1[ . 
Examples 
N = {1,2) 
P Since the set of fuzzy coalitions is the convex hull of the 
set of coalitions, we can write any fuzzy coalition in the 
form 
(2) c = C m(S)cs where m(S) - > 0, c m(S) = 1 
S E P(N) s € 3 ~ )  
The rates of participation are therefore defined by 
In other words, if m(S) denotes the probability of coalition 
S forming, the associated rate of participation of player i 
is the sum of probabilities of the formation of coalitions S 
to which i belongs. 
Remark 
W e  c a n  a l s o  i n t r o d u c e  more g e n e r a l l y  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o a l i t i o n s  
c E [-1 ,+I1 where a  n e g a t i v e  r a t e  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  c (i)  des-  
c r i b e s  an  a g r e s s i v e  behav io r  o f  p l a y e r  i i n  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  
c o a l i t i o n  c. 
Remark 
W e  can  u s e  a l s o  a  more adequa te  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  a  p l a y e r  i by 
i i i d e s c r i b i n g  him a s  a  v e c t o r  a  = (a l  , . . . , a  ) o f  I R P ,  where 
t h e  i n d e x e s  h  = I , . . . ,  f d e n o t e  " q u a l i t i e s "  and t h e  components 
i 
a k  o f  t h e  p l a y e r  a  d e s c r i b e  t h e  amount o f  q u a l i t y  k  t h a t  
p l a y e r  is  p o s s e s s e s .  Then a  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o a l i t i o n  C i s  a  
i 
m a t r i x  of  r a t e s  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  ch o f  t h e  P q u a l i t i e s  h  
o f  t h e  n  p l a y e r s  i. See J .P .  Aubin, Ch. Louis-Guerin and 
M.  Z a v a l l o n i  [I 9  791 . 
Remark 
W e  can  d e f i n e  a s  w e l l  f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n s  o f  an  i n f i n i t e  s u b s e t  
o f  p l a y e r s .  I n  game t h e o r y ,  it i s  cus tomary t o  r e p r e s e n t  a  
continuum o f  p l a y e r s  a s  a  measure s p a c e  N s u p p l i e d  w i t h  a  
9-a lgebra  ft and a  non-atomic measure p ( f o r  exemple, N:=[ 0,1] 
and t h e  l e b e s g u e  measure,  which i s  non-a tomic) .  
The s e t  ft o f  (measurab le )  s u b s e t s  i s  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  
s u b s e t  L ~ ( N , { O , ~ ) )  of  c l a s s e s  o f )  measurable functions with values in 
{ 0 , 1 ) .  The set  of  (measurab le )  fuzzy  c o a l i t i o n s  i s  e q u a l ,  
by d e f i n i t i o n ,  t o  L W ( N ,  [0,1] ),the uni t  ba l l  of LW(N,@). 
When w e  s u p p l y  L*(N ,R) w i t h  t h e  weak s t a r  t o p o l o g y ,  w e  can  
prove  t h a t  t h e  s e t  L*(N,  {O,1} ) of  c o a l i t i o n s  is  dense  i n  
t h e  se t  L*(N,  [O,1 1) o f  f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n s ,  which is  compact and 
convex. T h i s  is  a  consequence o f  t h e  Lyapunov c o n v e x i t y  
Theorem. (See  J .P.  Aubin, [1979b],  P r o p o s i t i o n  10-4-1, p. 319) 
C o o p e r a t i v e  f u z z y  games w i t h  s ide-payments  
C o o p e r a t i v e  f u z z y  games w i t h  s ide-payments  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  by 
a  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  V from [ 0 , 1  I "  t o  R ,  a s s o c i a t i n g  t o  
e v e r y  f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n  c i t s  l o s s  V ( c ) .  The problem a t  hand 
is  t o  a l l o c a t e  t h e  l o s s  V ( c N )  of  t h e  g rand  c o a l i t i o n  among 
t h e  n  p l a y e r s ,  i .e . ,  
( 4 )  f M  s:= (sl, ..., sn) €e such that  ZiE- si = V(%).  
We r e g a r d  e l e m e n t s  s € lpn a s  " m u l t i l o s s e s " .  The aim of  game 
t h e o r i c i s t s  was t o  f i n d  e q u i t a b l e  a l l o c a t i o n s  of t h e  l o s s  V ( 5 )  
by t a k i n g  i n  a c c o u n t  t h e  consequences  of t h e  c o o p e r a t i o n  among 
p l a y e r s  d e s c r i b e d  a  p r i o r i  by t h e  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  V. 
I n  t h i s  framework, t h e  r a t e s  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n s  a r e  o n l y  r e l a -  
t i v e .  So w e  can  assume t h a t  V i s  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous, and 
t h u s ,  e x t e n d  it t o  Rn+. 
D e f i n i t i o n  1  
A c o o p e r a t i v e  f u z z y  qame w i t h  s i d e  payments i s  d e s c r i b e d  by 
a  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous f u n c t i o n  V from R: t o  R  which 
is  l o c a l l y  l i p s c h i t z  on t h e  i n t e r i o r  Gn+ o f  lRn+ 
T h i s  f u n c t i o n  V i s  c a l l e d  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n .  
The s u b s e t  n  
(6) M:={s E x n +  I br c E  xn+, Z ci si 5 v ( c ) }  
i= 1
i s  c a l l e d  t h e  s u b s e t  of  a c c e p t e d  m u l t i l o s s e s .  
T h i s  i s  mot iva ted  by t h e  f a c t  t h a t ,  f o r  each  c o a l i t i o n  
c E [O,1 ln, t h e  l o s s  a l l o c a t e d  a  p o s t e r i o r i  t o  the  f u z z y  
c o a l i t i o n  c a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  r a t e s  of  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  
n  
p l a y e r s ,  which i s  e q u a l  t o  Z ci sir  i s  a t  most e q u a l  t o  
t h e  l o s s  V ( c )  y i e l d e d  a  pri&;l t o  t h i s  f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n  accor -  
d i n g  t o  t h e  r u l e s  of  t h e  game d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  c o a l i t i o n  
l o s s  f u n c t i o n  V. 
W e  o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  c o n j u q a t e  f u n c t i o n  V* d e f i n e d  by 
(-7) V * ( s )  = sup, ( < c , s >  - V ( c ) )  
c E x  + 
i s  t h e  i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  s u b s e t  M of  a c c e p t e d  m u l t i l o s s e s  
(see J .P .  Aubin [ 1979 a ] ' ,  c h a p t e r  10)  
Now, w e  d e s c r i b e  s e v e r a l  axioms t h a t  any a l l o c a t i o n  r u l e  
of  t h e  l o s s  V ( c N )  s h o u l d  r e s p e c t .  An a l l o c a t i o n  r u l e  i s  by 
d e f i n i t i o n  a  s e t - v a l u e d  map S t h a t  a s s o c i a t e s  w i t h  any c o a l i -  
t i o n  loss f u n c t i o n  V a  s u b s e t  S ( V )  o f  m u l t i l o s s e s  s E  xn 
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  ( 4 ) .  
T h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  a l s o  known under  t h e  name of  " e f f i c i e n c y  
axiom" o r  " P a r e t o  c p t i m a l i t y  axiom". W e  d e f i n e  a s  w e l l  o t h e r  
axioms. 
Symmetry axiom 
Let us consider a permutation 8 : N+N of the set of n players, 
which describes the order in which the players are called. 
We define the action of 8 on the function V by 
and the action of 8 on the multiloss s EIRn by 
(9) (8*sIi = s 8 (i) for all i = 1 ,... ,n. 
The symmetry axiom states that an allocation rule does not 
depend upon " how the players are named", in the sens that 
(10) for all permutation 8, S (8*V) = 8* S (V) 
Atomicity axiom 
When P:= (S, , . . . ,Sm) is a partition of the set N in m nomenpty 
coalitions S j (l<j<m) - -  we associate with any coalition loss 
function V of a n-person game the coalition loss function 
PaV of a m-person game defined by 
( (~:o~)(d~~...,d~) := V(C lt...~n) where ck = d: 3 
(I1 ) [when k belongs to S j 
We associate also to any n-loss s €lRn the m-loss 
PPS f lRn defined by 
The a tomic i ty  axiom s t a t e s  t h a t  
Dummy axiom 
Le t  u s  cons ide r  a  s u b s e t  N of a  s u b s e t  M of m p l a y e r s  and a  
c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  V : N -+ lR of a  n-person game. 
Le t  nN denote  t h e  p r o j e c t o r  from lRm t o  lRn de f ined  by 
when j E N 
( 1 4 )  ( n N s )  := 
0 when j & N 
We a s s o c i a t e  wi th  V t h e  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  nNAV of t h e  
m-person game de f ined  by 
( 1  5 )  ( r N A V )  ( d )  := V ( r N d )  
The dummy axiom s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  dummy p l a y e r s  ( p l a y e r s  who 
do n o t  belong t o  N )  r e c e i v e  no th ing  : 
(16)  S (nN AV) = n N  S ( V ) .  
Cla rke  qene ra l i zed  g r a d i e n t s  
W e  r e f e r  t o  Aubin [ 19781 , Clarke  [I9751 and Rockafe l la r  
11978 1 f o r  f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s .  
When V is  l i p s c h i t z  around co E lRn,  we can d e f i n e  t h e  folowing 
l i m i t  ( c a l l e d  t h e  upper Clarke  d e r i v a t i v e  of V a t  c i n  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  d )  
V(c+hd)-V(C) E lR 
c+ V (co ) ( d )  := l i m  s u p  
c -+ C o  h  
W e  t h u s  c a n  prove  t h a t  
d  -+ C+V (co ) ( d )  is  convex , p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneoust c o n t i n u o u s .  
and t h a t  
I ( c t d )  -+ C+V ( c )  ( d )  i s  upper  semicon t inuous  
a t  ( C O ,  1- d o )  f o r  a l l  d o  E I R ~  
T h e r e f o r e ,  d -+ C+V ( c o )  ( d )  is t h e  s u p p o r t  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  
bounded c l o s e d  convex s u b s e t  
aV(co)  := {s E lRn I V d  E lRn, <s ,d>  - < C + V ( c o )  ( d )  1 
which is  c a l l e d  t h e  C l a r k e  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t .  
W e  o b s e r v e  t h a t  
i/ When V is  c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  a t  C o t  t h e n  
av(co) = Iw(c0)  1
ii/ When V is  convex and c o n t i n u o u s  a t  c o t  t h e n  
n  
a v ( c 0 )  = {S  E ~ R ~  I v(c . ) -v(c)  5 < s , c o - C > V C  E IR 1 
i s  t h e  s u b d i f f e r e n t i a l  of  V a t  C o  o f  convex a n a l y s i s  (see 
Aubin [ I 9 7 9 1  a ,  chap.  10 ,  R o c k a f e l l a r  [ 1 9 7 0 1  f o r  f u r t h e r  
d e t a i l s  ) . 
T h i s  i s  t h e  r e a s o n  why a V ( C o )  i s  c a l l e d  a  g e n e r a l i z e d  
g r a d i e n t .  
We also define the upper contingent derivative defined by 
D+ V(Co) (do):= lim inf V(c0 +hd) - V(Co) 
d -k do h 
h -k o+ 
We always have 
D+ V(CO) (do) f C+ V(co) (do) 
We say that V is regular at co if 
Continuously differentiable functions at co and convex 
continuous functions at CO are regular at CO. 
We have the folowing properties 
Equality holds when P. is surjective or when V is regular 
If V is non decreasing, aV(Co) C IR: 
If V is positively homogeneous, 
If V:= sup Vi, if I (cot= {il v(c~)=v~(co)) , 
i=l,... ,n 
then 
Equality holds when the functions Vi are regular. 
D e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  se t  o f  s o l u t i o n s  t o  a  c o o p e r a t i v e  f u z z y  
game 
So,  l e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  a  game whose c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  V i s  
0 
l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  on R:. 
W e  propose  t h e  fo lowing  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a  s o l u t i o n  c o n c e p t  t o  
t h e  game. 
D e f i n i t i o n  2.  
L e t  c{=(l, ..., 1 )  d e n o t e  t h e  v h o l e  se t  of  p l a y e r s .  W e  s h a l l  
s a y  t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t  aV ( C N )  of V a t  CN is  t h e  
se t  o f  s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  game. W e  se t  
A m u l t i - u t i l i t y  s E a V ( C N )  c a n  be i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  t h e  sequence  
o f  m a r g i n a l  l o s s e s  si o f  p l a y e r s  i when t h e y  j o i n  t h e  whole 
se t  o f  p l a y e r s .  The i t h  component si a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  i t h  
p l a y e r  s a t i s f i e s  
Theorem 1  
L e t  V be a  l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  game. The se t  S  ( V )  o f  s o l u t i o n s  
t o  t h e  game i s  non-empty, convex and compact. I t  s a t i s f i e s  
t h e  P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y ,  symmetry and dummy p r o p e r t i e s ,  a s  w e l l  
a s  
i/ S(hV) = hS(V) f o r  a l l  hEIR 
/ 
ii/ S  (V+W) C S  ( V )  + S  ( W )  . 
iii/ I f  V i s  i n c r e a s i n g ,  then S  ( V )  C IR;. 
- i v /  I f  A E $ ( I R ~ ,  IRn) s a t i s f i e s  AcM - cN then  
S(VA)C A*S(V) where A* i s  t h e  t r anspose  of A. 
I f  A is  s u r j e c t i v e  o r  i f  V i s  r e g u l a r  a t  cN, w e  have 
S(V A )  = A*S(V). When V i s  r e g u l a r ,  t h e  s o l u t i o n  set 
s a t i s f i e s  t h e  a t o m i c i t y  p roper ty .  
A 
Proof 
The p r o p e r t i e s  of t h e  Clarke  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t  imply a t  
once t h a t  S(V) is  non-empty, convex and compact and t h a t  
p r o p e r t i e s  (19)  ho ld  t r u e .  
The f a c t  t h a t  S  ( V )  is  an a l l o c a t i o n  r u l e  fo.llows from t h e  
f a c t  t h a t  V is  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous, because 
The o t h e r s  axioms a r e  s a t i s f i e d  thank t o  p rope r ty  (19)  iv / :  
Symmetry Proper ty  
We apply p rope r ty  ( 1  9 )  i v /  f o r  t h e  ma t r ix  A = (a!) 
j de f ined  by a  1 i f  j = 8-' (i)  and a!:= 0 i f  j * z1 (i) ,
which isomorphism s a t i s f y i n g  A c N  
Atomicity P rope r ty  
W e  apply p r o p e r t y  ( 1  9  ) i v /  f o r  t h e  ma t r ix  P  from lRm t o  lRn 
de f ined  by 
(PdIi:= d .  whenever i €  A I j 
which is  an i n j e c t i v e  map s a t i s f y i n g  P  cM = c  N '  
Dummy Prope r ty  
We apply p rope r ty  (1 9 )  i v /  f o r  t h e  ma t r ix  rrN from lRm t o  Rn , 
which is  a  s u r j e c t i v e  map s a t i s f y i n g  nNcM = cN.  
The concept  of  s o l u t i o n  S (V) :=  aV(cN) r e q u i r e s  t h a t  t h e  
grand c o a l i t i o n  cN  p l a y s  a  p r i v i l e g e d  r o l e .  We observe t h a t  
f o r  every c o a l i t i o n  c  E  i n t  R:, t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t  
aV(c) p rov ides  a  s u b s e t  of a l l o c a t i o n s  of V(c)  s i n c e  
f o r  V i s  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous. We can prove a  p a r t i a l  
converse  t o  h i s  remark. 
Assume t h a t  V is  l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  on a  neighborhood oflRy. 
Then w e  can a s s o c i a t e  t o  any accepted m u l t i l o s s  s EM a  fuzzy 
c o a l i t i o n  c such t h a t  
Proof 
W e  a p p l y  Ky F a n k i n e q u a l i t y  (See  Fan [I 968 1) t o  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
Q d e f i n e d  on t h e  n-simplex sn by 
which is  concave w h i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  d ,  lower semi-cont inuous  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  c .  I1 a l s o  s a t i s f i e s  
JI:ctc) = <c,s> - c+ V ( c )  ( c )  = < C I S >  - V ( c )  - < 0 
when s b e l o n g s  t o  t h e  s u b s e t  M of  a c c e p t e d  m u l t i l o s s e s , s i n c e  
V i s  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous. 
S i n c e  sn is convex and compact,  Ky F a n ' s  i n e q u a l i t y  i m p l i e s  
t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  E E sn such  t h a t  
W e  i n f e r  t h a t  s b e l o n g s  t o  a V ( a )  - a:. 
Remark 
The p r o p e r t i e s  of  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t  imply t h e  c o r r e s -  
ponding p r o p e r t i e s  of  t h e  s o l u t i o n  sets S ( V ) .  W e  mention f o r  
i n s t a n c e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  one. 
L e t  J be a f i n i t e  s e t ,  V:= s u p  V be t h e  poin.twisesupremum 
~ E J  j 
of  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  V and J (cN) = { j  E J s u c h  t h a t  V (cN) = j 
I f  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  V are r e g u l a r  a t  cN, t h e n  j 
Core o f  s u b - a d d i t i v e  games 
W e  s h a l l  s a y  t h a t  t h e  f u z z y  game d e s c r i b e d  by a c o a l i t i o n  
l o s s  f u n c t i o n  V i s  s u b - a d d i t i v e  i f  
S i n c e  V i s  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous, t h i s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s a y  
t h a t  V is  convex. Such games c a p t u r e  t h e  idea t h a t  " l ' u n i o n  
f a i t  l a  f o r c e " .  
I n d e e d ,  i f  S  and T are two d i s j o i n t  u s u a l  c o a l i t i o n s ,  t h e n  
' S U T  i s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  f u n c t i o n  o f  S  U T and i n e q u a l i t y  
( 2 5 )  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
n  On When V is  convex and f i n i t e  onlR+,  it is  c o n t i n u o u s  onlR+. 
We s h a l l  e x t e n d  it t o  lRn by s e t t i n g  V ( c )  = + mwhen 
c lR: and assume t h a t  
( 2 7 )  V is  l ower  s e m i c o n t i n u o u s  from lRn t o  R U  {+m) 
Then w e  know t h a t  S  ( V )  = a V ( c  ) is  t h e  s u b d i f f e r e n t i a l  N 
of  V a t  cN. W e  have  t h e r e f o r e  : 
P r o p o s i t i o n  2  
We assume t h a t  t h e  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  i s  s u b - a d d i t i v e  
and lower  s e m i c o n t i n u o u s .  Then 
n  
Proof  
L e t  s b e l o n g  t o  S  ( V )  . 
S i n c e  
( 2 9 )  V ( c N )  - V ( c )  5 <s,cN-C> f o r  a l l  c E R: , 
w e  deduce  t h a t ,  by t a k i n g  c 0'- XcN, 
T h e r e f o r e ,  by c h o o s i n g  X =  1 f c , w e  o b t a i n  
and t h u s  
Converse ly ,  i n e q u a l i t i e s  (30)  and (31 ) imply (29)  . 
D e f i n i t i o n  3  
The s u b s e t  o f  a c c e p t e d  m u l t i l o s s e s  s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  P a r e t o  
o p t i m a l i t y  axiom i s  c a l l e d  t h e  c o r e  o f  t h e  game. 
-
T h e r e f o r e ,  when V is  s u b - a d d i t i v e ,  w e  have proved t h a t  t h e  
s o l u t i o n  se t  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e  c o r e  of  t h e  game. A 
Smooth games and t h e i r  Shapley  v a l u e s  
L e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c l a s s  o f  games whose c o a l i t i o n  wor th  
f u n c t i o n  V i s  c o n t i n u o u s l y  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  a t  cN. Then 
c o n t a i n s  o n l y  one  e l e m e n t ,  which i s  t h e  g r a d i e n t  of  V a t  cN. 
For i n s t a n c e ,  i f  w e  t a k e  V:=yk where 
n  
k i  ( 3 3 )  y k ( c ) : =  ( r ! .  c i )  l /  lkl  , k = ( k l , .  . . , k n ) ,  lk(=k1+k2+. .  .+kn,  
i = l  
w e  see t h a t  
D e f i n i t i o n  4 
We s h a l l  s a y  t h a t  t h e  map v  + VV(cN) i s  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  
Shap ley  v a l u e  of t h e  game. A 
P r o p o s i t i o n  2 
L e t  Y/'be t h e  v e c t o r  s p a c e  of  games spanned by t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
Yk when k  r a n g e s  o v e r  N n .  Then S  is  t h e  u n i q u e  l i n e a r  map 
from Y t o  IRn t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y ,  symmetry 
and a t o m i c i t y  p r o p e r t i e s .  A 
L e t  Q be a  map s a t i s f y i n g  t h o s e  t h r e e  p r o p e r t i e s .  L e t  
a:= ( 1 , . . . , 1 ) .  The P a r e t o  o p t i m a l i t y  and symmetry p r o p e r t i e s  
imply t h a t  Q ( y  ) = ( l / n ) P ,  f o r  a l l  i = l , . . . , n .  n i 
L e t  k= (k , ,  . . . kn)  be long  t o  N". I f  w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p a r t i t i o n  P  
of t h e  set  o f  Ik 1 p l a y e r s  i n  n  s u b s e t s  A 1  o f  k  p l a y e r s , .  . . ,A  r 
o f  kn p l a y e r s ,  w e  c a n  w r i t e  t h a t  
lk I 1/ lk I 
Yk = I k I  where y l k l ( c ) =  ( ll c j )  . 
j = l  
Hence t h e  a t o m i c i t y  axiom i m p l i e s  t h a t  
So, o(yk)  = S ( y k )  f o r  a l l  k  E N". S i n c e  t h e  maps S  and a r e  
b o t h  l i n e a r ,  t h e y  c o i n c i d e  on  7. 
S t r a t e q i c  Games 
W e  s h a l l  a s s o c i a t e  a  f uzzy  c o o p e r a t i v e  game w i t h  a  s t r a t e g y  
s p ace  Y ,  a  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  f  d e f i n e d  on Y x  [ O,11 and a  set-  
va lued  map F  from Y t o  lR: d e s c r i b i n g  e i t h e r  t h e  fuzzy  
c o a l i t i o n s  t h a t  form when a  s t r a t e g y  x  is  implemented and/or  
t h e  s t r a t e g i e s  implemented by a  g e n e r a l i z e d  c o a l i t i o n .  
Namely, w e  i n t r o d u c e  
i/ a  Banach space  Y and a  c l o s e d  convex cone K C Y ,  
r ega rded  a s  t h e  cone o f  f e a s i b l e  s t r a t e g i e s .  
ii/ a p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  f u n c t i o n  
d e f i n e d  on a  neighborhood o f  K x  lR: ; ( f o r  any 
fuzzy  c o a l i t i o n  c ,  y  + f  ( y , c )  i s  r ega rded  a s  t h e  
l o s s  f u n c t i o n  o f  c ) .  
n  iii/ a  s e t -va lued  map F  from K t o  lR+,  whose g raph  i s  a  11 ' c l o s e d  convex cone ( such  se t  va lued  maps a r e  c a l l e d  
c l o s e d  convex p r o c e s s e s  (see R o c k a f e l l a r  [ I9671 and 
[I 970 1 s e c t i o n  3 9 ) .  
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  V is  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous. 
For s t u d y i n g  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h i s  game, 
w e  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  a d j o i n t  p r o c e s s  F* o f  F  d e f i n e d  by 
I t  is  a n o t h e r  c l o s e d  convex p r o c e s s  mapping lRn t o  Y*. 
Theorem 2 
We p o s i t  assumptions ( 3 4 ) .  We assume a l s o  t h a t  
-1 
i i  c 3 q . 0  such t h a t  F (c+qB) is bounded. 
- -1 
Then we can a s s o c i a t e  wi th  any op t imal  s t r a t e g y  y e  ( c N ) ,  
-1 
achiev ing  t h e  maximum of f ( y , c N )  on F ( c N ) ,  a  s o l u t i o n  
s E  S ( V )  t o  t h e  game, and p E  X*,  E  lRn s a t i s f y i n g  
Remark 
I f  f  i s  cont inuous ly  d i f f e r e n t i a b l e ,  cond i t i on  ( 3 6 )  becomes 
Proof 
Assumptions (34)  and (35)  imply t h a t  v  i s  l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  
on lR: : t h i s  is  a d i r e c t  consequence of t h e  Robinson-Ursescu 
theorem ; ( s e e  Robinson [ I  9 7 6  1 , Ursescu [ 19771  . 
- 1  - - 
L e t  E F  (c,) s a t i s f y i n g  V ( c N ) = f  ( y , c ) .  L e t  any ( y , c )  be 
chosen i n  t h e  g raph  o f  F. S i n c e  it i s  convex,  (1-0)  { ? , c N ) +  
e ( y , c )  b e l o n g s  t o  t h e  g raph  of  F, i .e . ,  ~ + B ( ~ - ~ ) E F -  (cN+ 6 
(c-c,) ) . 
and w e  deduce t h a t V  ( y , c )  E  g raph  ( F ) ,  
By t a k i n g  t h e  l i m  s u p  when 8  + 0, w e  deduce t h a t  
W e  r e c a l l  t h a t  t h e  upper  C l a r k e  d e r i v a t i v e  i s  t h e  s u p p o r t  
f u n c t i o n  of  t h e  g e n e r a l i z e d  g r a d i e n t .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
0 - 5 i n f  s u p  sup  [ <s-< , c - c , > + < - ~ , ~ - ? j  
( y , c ) E g r a p h  ( F )  SES (v )  , ( ~ ) ~ a f  (y ,cN) 
The g raph  o f  F  i s  convex,  t h e  s u b s e t  s (v)  xaf ( y , c F )  i s  convex 
and compact and t h e  f u n c t i o n  ( (y ,c ) , ( s  , p ,  5 )  he- {,c-cN>+ 
< - ~ , ~ - y >  i s  s e p a r a t e l y  a f f i n e .  
Hence t h e  l o p - s i d e d  minimax Theorem (see Aubin [I9791 a ,  
- - 
chap. 2 )  i m p l i e s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  of  5 E S  ( V )  and Eaf (?,cN) 
such  t h a t  
S i n c e  t h e  g raph  o f  F  is  a  cone ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
- - 
and t h a t  < p l y > - < s -  S,c> 5 0 f o r  a l l  ( y , c ) q r a p h ( ~ ) .  
- 
- - 
Hence p E  F* ( s - S  ) . 
I 
Core and Shap ley  v a l u e s  of u s u a l  c o o p e r a t i v e  qames 
Usual  c o o p e r a t i v e  games a r e  d e f i n e d  by c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  
f u n c t i o n s  v  from t h e  subset !?  ( N )  of u s u a l  c o a l i t i o n s  
t o  IR, a s s o c i a t i n g  t o  e a c h  c o a l i t i o n  S  i t s  l o s s  v ( S ) E  IR. 
W e  s h a l l  be a b l e  t o  a s s o c i a t e  a  c o n c e p t  of  s o l u t i o n  
whenever we can  a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  a  f u n c t i o n  v : ~ ( N ) +  IR 
a  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous V = ~ V  from IR: t o  R ,  l o c a l l y  
L i p s c h i t z  on t h e  i n t e r i o r  o f  IR:, by t a k i n g  S ( n v )  . So,  
w e  may d e v i s e  a s  many c o n c e p t s  of  s o l u t i o n s  a s  e x t e n s i o n  
maps from u s u a l  c o o p e r a t i v e  games t o  f u z z y  c o o p e r a t i v e  
games. 
L e t  v  be a  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  f r o m P ( N )  t o  IR. W e  
d e f i n e  t h e  se t  of  a c c e p t e d  m u l t i l o s s e s  a s  t h e  
D e f i n i t i o n  5 
W e  s h a l l  s a y  t h a t  t h e  c o r e  C ( v )  of  t h e  u s u a l  c o o p e r a t i v e  
game d e s c r i b e d  by V : ~ ( N ) + P  i s  t h e  set o f  a ccep t ed  mu l t i -  
l o s s e s  s E M such  t h a t  C si = v  ( N )  . 
i= 1 A 
T h i s  s u g g e s t s  t o  a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  v  a  sub -add i t i ve  c o o p e r a t i v e  
fuzzy  game whose set  of  accep ted  m u l t i l o s s e s  i s  equa l  t o  M. 
T hi s  can be done by d e f i n i n g  a V :  I R ~ + I R  i n  t h e  fo l l owing  way 
( 38 )  I T V ( C ) : =  s u p  <c,s> 
sEM 
which is  c a l l e d  t h e  "convex cover"  o f  t h e  game v. 
The fuzzy  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  I T V  i s  t h e  s u p p o r t  f u n c t i o n  
o f  t h e  s e t  M of  a ccep t ed  m u l t i l o s s e s .  
W e  always have i n e q u a l i t i e s  
W e  s h a l l  s a y  t h a t  t h e  game is  ba lanced  i f  
I t  is  an e x e r c i s e  t o  v e r i f y  t h e  fo l l owing  s t a t emen t .  
The c o r e  C ( v )  is  i-Donempty i f  and o n l y  i f  t h e  game is  
balanced.  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
T h i s  e x t e n s i o n  map .rr s e n d s  u s u a l  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n s  
t o  s u b - a d d i t i v e  f u z z y  c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n s .  Now, w e  
i n t r o d u c e  a n o t h e r  e x t e n s i o n  map x a s s o c i a t i n g  smooth f u z z y  
c o a l i t i o n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n s .  W e  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  
y  s (SCN) d e f i n e d  by 
( 4 7  y s ( c )  := ( il ci) 
1/lsI 
where I S [  = c a r d ( S )  
iES 
( W e  o b s e r v e  t h a t  yG = d e f i n e d  i n  ( 3 3 )  w i t h  k  = cS 
W e  a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  any c o a l i t i o n  S  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l s  as 
d e f i n e d  by 
W e  d e f i n e  x by 
(43)  1 c  en:, x v ( c )  = a s  ( v )  y  s ( c )  
SCN 
W e  check ' t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e m e n t .  
P r o p o s i t i o n  4 
The Shap ley  v a l u e  of  t h e  f u z z y  game d e f i n e d  byxv is  e q u a l  t o  
W e  r e c o g n i z e  t h e  Shap ley  v a l u e  of u s u a l  games (See Aubin 
[ I9791  b ,  chap . .  1 1 ,  Shap ley  11953 I ) .  
The map v  + S ( X V )  i s  t h e  unique l i n e a r  o p e r a t o r  from t h e  
s p ace  o f  f u n c t i o n s  v : y ( ~ ) + l R  t o  lRn s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  P a r e t o  
symmetry and dummy axioms. 
Hence, t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  concep t s  o f  c o r e  and 
Shap ley  v a l u e s  o f  u s u a l  games does  r e s u l t  o n l y  from t h e  
two d i f f e r e n t  ways by which a  u s u a l  game i s  t r ans formed  
t o  a  f u z z y  game, b u t  does  n o t  f o l l o w  from a  c o n f l i c t  
between two a n t a g o n i s t  views ove r  what a  s o l u t i o n  concep t  
shou ld  be ,  because  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  is  r e s o l v e d  i n  t h e  
framework o f  f uzzy  games. 
G a m e s  w i t hou t  s ide-payments 
W e  a s s o c i a t e  t o  any fuzzy  c o a l i t i o n  c t h e  map c. from 
lRn t o  lRn d e f i n e d  by 
A f u z z y  game w i t h o u t  s ide-payments i s  d e f i n e d  by i t s  c o a l i -  
t i o n  l o s s  s e t -va lued  map 3 from [ 0,  11" t o  lRn s a t i s f y i n g .  
n  ii/ v cE[O, 11 , y(c )  is  c l o s e d ,  convex,  comprehensive 
1 i n  t h e  s ense  t h a t  I ~ ( C ) C ~ ( C ) + C . I R ~ I  and 
bounded below [ i n  t h e  s e n s  t h a t 3 x O ~ l R n  
1 such t h a t  $ (c )Cc .  (x.+lR:) 1, 
iii/ V is p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous [ i n  t h e  s e n s  t h a t  
V X 3 0 ,  ~ X C )  = X , V ( C ) ] .  
T h i s  a l l o w s  t o  e x t e n d  X t o  R: by s e t t i n g  
n  n  
S i n c e  t h e  s u b s e t s  J ( c )  a r e  c l o s e d  and convex,  t h e y  can  be 
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h e i r  lower s u p p o r t  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e d  by 
S i n c e  V ( c )  is  comprehensive and bounded below, V ( c , X  ) is  
n  f i n i t e  i f  and o n l y  i f  X€c.lR+. 
W e  s h a l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c l a s s  o f  l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  games. W e  
s a y  t h a t  a  game is  l o c a l l y  L i p s c h i t z  i f  
i/ t h e  f u n c t i o n s  e V ( c , X  ) a r e  univormly l o c a l l y  
L i p s c h i t z  on 
W e  a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  any X E sn t h e  s u b s e t  
Definition 6 
We shall say that the subset 
( 5 0 )  S ( 1 )  = ;Y(cN) n U C (A) 
A€sn 
is the set of solutions to the game. 
Theorem 3 
Let be a locally Lipschitz game without side-payments. 
Then its set of solutions is non-empty. 
A 
Remark 
We can regard the game with side payments whose coalition 
loss fonction is V(c,A) as a tangent game whose set of 
solutions is C (A) . Then S (XI is the set of those multi- 
utilities s€V(cN) that are solutions to at least one of 
ry- 
the tangent games. 
Proof 
We recall that V(c,p) = sup <p,s> is the support function 
sqcc, 
of the closed convex bounded above and comprehensive subset 
V(C)CC-IR~. 
*Y 
If A , then 
where p/X is  t h e  v e c t o r  o f  components pi /h i .  
Assumption ( 4 8 )  ii/ i m p l i e s  t h a t  (X,a)+c+v(c,,X) ( a )  i s  
n upper-semicont inuous  on $+ x R". 
Indeed,  l e t  (Xo,ao) E;: X IRn ; f o r  a l l  D > 0, t h e r e  e x i s t s  
a  > o such t h a t  
1 
L e t  u s  t a k e  I X 1 -  Xol < a a n d I I A l -  - X l l < _ c l ,  - I1 a l - a o l l ~ E / 2 E  
( R  be ing  t h e  L i p s c h i t z  c o n s t a n t ) .  
Hence 
B y  l e t t i n g  a converge  t o  0 ,  w e  deduce t h a t  
whenever 11 X I  - A o  2 a o ,  llal - a01 1€ /2%-  
- 
So,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  $ , d e f i n e d  on x  i: by 
is  concave  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  p ,  lower semicon t inuous  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  A ,  and s a t i s f i e s  
s i n c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  c + V ( c , A )  is  p o s i t i v e l y  homogeneous. L e t  
u s  t a k e  s < l / n  and c o n s i d e r  t h e  convex compact s u b s e t  
n  SF:= {A@:lmin A i  >_ - E and , Z i = l A i  = 1 ) .  The Ky Fan inequa- 
l i t y  (see Fan [I968 I o r  Aubin [1978a,] ch .5 ,  p. 203 ) 
i m p l i e s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  A E  ES: such  t h a t  
n  + v EIR:, o < ~ ( - c ( A ~ ) + J ( c , ) - ( s , )  - , p ) .  
n + Hence t h e r e  e x i s t s  SEE C ( A E  ) (S(C,) - (SE ) 9 
We can  c h e c k ,  a s  i n  Aubin [1979b,] ch .  12 , t h a t  sE is  
bounded. Thus subsequences  ( a g a i n  deno ted  st and A E )  converge 
t o  some s E J ( c N )  and AE sn. S i n c e  
A,* s E EaV(cN,AE 1 ,  
we deduce t h a t  f o r  a l l  a m : ,  
S i n c e  t h e  r igh t -hand  s ide is  upper semicon t inuous  w i th  
r e s p e c t  t o  X E ,  it f o l l o w s  t h a t  
i .e . ,  t h a t  s E  C ( X ) .  
Act ion  games and fo rmat ion  o f  c o a l i t i o n s  
W e  change r a d i c a l l y  o u r  p o i n t  o f  view f o r  d e f i n i n g  games, 
by adop t i ng  a  dynamical  p o i n t  o f  view, 
L e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  n  p l a y e r s  i = l , . . . , n ,  W e  suppose t h a t  t h e  
behav ior  o f  t h e  ith p l a y e r  is  described by i t s  a c t i o n  
on t h e  environment  f o r  t r an s fo rming  it, W e  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
environment by 
a  c l o s e d  convex s u b s e t  L o f  a  f i n i t e  d imens iona l  
(51 ( space  X = IRP 
Act ion  o f  p l a y e r  i is  d e s c r i b e d  by a  map f i  from L t o  X 
a s s o c i a t i n g  w i th  each  s t a t e  x  E L o f  t h e  environment t h e  
r a t e  o f  change f i ( x )  t h a t  p l a y e r  i f o r c e s  on t h e  environment 
A v e r y  impor t an t  example i s  t h e  c a s e  when f i  ( x )  = Vui ( x )  i s  
t h e  g r a d i e n t  a t  x  o f  a  u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  U i .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
a c t i o n  o f  p l a y e r  i amounts t o  t h e  marg ina l  i n c r e a s e  of  
u t i l i t y .  
W e  suppose t h a t  t h e  a c t i o n  of  a  f uzzy  c o a l i t i o n  c E [ 0,1] 
on t h e  environment i s  t h e  sum of p l a y e r s  i m u l t i p l i e d  by 
n  
t h e i r  r a t e s  o f  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  ( i . e . ,  C ci f i ( x ) ) .  
i = l  
Le t  g  : L + X d e s c r i b e  t h e  endogeneous evo lu t ion  law of 
t h e  environment i n  t h e  absence of p l a y e r s .  
This  d e s c r i b e s  an a c t i o n  game, i n  t h e  s ense  t h a t  t h e  
e v o l u t i o n  law of t h e  s t a t e s  of t h e  environment i s  
desc r ibed  by t h e  s e t  C ( x )  of v e l o c i t i e s  de f ined  by 
Now, an e q u i l i b r i u m  x E L i s  a  s t a t e  of t h e  environment 
t h a t  remains i n v a r i a n t  under t h e  a c t i o n  of a  fuzzy c o a l i t i o r  
c E [ 0 ~ 1 1 ~ .  
D e f i n i t i o n  7 
- - 
An e q u i l i b r i u m  is  a  p a i r  ( x , c )  of a  s t a t e  and a fuzzy 
c o a l i t i o n  c s a t i s f y i n g  
I f  L i s  a  c l o s e d  convex s u b s e t ,  we d e f i n e  t h e  t angen t  
cone TL(x)  t o  L a t  x  by 
I t  is  a c losed  convex cone, which c o i n c i d e s  wi th  t h e  
t angen t  space when K i s  a  smooth manifold.  
Theorem 4 
Assume t h a t  L i s  compact and t h a t  
n  
(54)  Y X E  L , ~ C E  [0, 1 "  such t h a t  g ( x ) +  C ci f i ( x ) E ~ L ( x ) .  
i=1 
- - 
Then t h e r e  e x i s t s  an equ i l i b r ium ( x , c )  of t h e  a c t i o n  game. 
Proof 
W e  apply Browd-er-Fan's Theorem (see Y.ubin [1 979aI : chap. 15)  
t o  t h e  se t -va lued  map C de f ined  on t h e  compact convex 
which is  obvious ly  upper semicontinuous wi th  convex 
compact va lues .  Assumption (55)  imp l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
t a n g e n t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  
is  s a t i s f i e d .  Hence, t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  s t a t e  E  L such 
t h a t  0 belongs t o  C ( x ) ,  and t h u s ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  fuzzy 
c o a l i t i o n  c s a t i s f a y i n g  ( 5 3 ) .  
Ac tua l ly ,  t h i s  framework a l lows  a  dynamical t r ea tmen t  of 
a c t i o n  games. W e  deduce from a  theorem of Haddad ( s e e  
Haddad [1 980 1) t h e  fo l lowing  r e s u l t .  
Theorem 5 
W e  p o s i t  t h e  assumpt ions  o f  Theorem 4 .  For any i n i t i a l  
s t a t e  xo E L I  t h e r e  e x i s t s  an a b s o l u t e l y  con t i nuous  
f u n c t i o n  x ( . )  and a  measurable  f u n c t i o n  c ( . )  such t h a t  
i/ f o r  a lmos t  a l l  t > o ,  - X I  ( t ) = g ( x ( t )  )+igl  c i ( t ) f i ( x ( t )  
(57 
s a t i s f y i n g  t h e  v i a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  
2 
For a lmos t  a l l  t > o l  - t h e  s t a t e  x ( t )  and t h e  f uzzy  
c o a l i t i o n  c ( t )  a r e  r e l a t e d  by t h e  feedback r e l a t i o n  : 
R E F E R E N C E S  
AUBIN, J.-P., 1974a, Coeur et valeur des jeux flous a paiements 
lateraux, Comptes Rendus de llAcademie des Sciences 279,891-894. 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1974b, Coeur et equilibres des jeux flous sans 
paiements lateraux, Comptes Rendus de lVAcademie des Sciences 
279, 963-966. 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1977ar Applied Abstracts Analysis (Wiley, New-York) 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1978 1 ,  Gradients generalis6.s de Clarke, Annales des 
Sciences Mathematiques, Quebec 2, 197-252. 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1979 a, Applied Functional Analysis (Wiley, NewUrl 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1979b, Mathematical methods of game and economic 
theory (North-Holland, Amsterdam). 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1980, Formation of coalitions in a dynamical model 
where agents act on the environment. Economie et societe. 1583- 
1594. 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1981a, Locally Lipschitz cooperative games. Journal 
of Mathematical Economics 8, 241-262. 
AUBIN, J.-P., 1981b, Cooperative fuzzy games. Mathematics of 
Operations Research 6, 1-13. 
AUBIN, J.-P., Ch. LOUIS-GUERIN and M. ZAVALLONI, 1979, Compatibi- 
lit6 entre conduites sociales rgelles dans des groupes et les 
representations symboliques de ces groupes, Mathgmatiques et 
Sciences Humaines 68, 27-62. 
AUMANN, R . J . ,  1969, Markets  w i t h  a continuum of t r a d e r s ,  
Econometrica 32,  39-50. 
AUMANN, R . J .  and L.S. SHAPLEY, 1979, Values  of  non-atomic games 
( P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  P r i n c e t o n ,  N J ) .  
BILLERA, L.J . ,  1971, Some r e c e n t  r e s u l t s  i n  n-person game t h e o r y ,  
Mathematical  Programming 1 ,  58-67. 
CLARKE, F . H . ,  1976, A new approach t o  Langrange m u l t i p l i e r s ,  
Mathematics o f  O p e r a t i o n s  Research 1 ,  165-179. 
DEBX9U, G.  and M. SCARF, 1963, A l i m i t  theorem on t h e  c o r e  of  
an economy, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Economic Review 4 ,  235-246. 
HADDAD, G., 1981a. Monotone V iab l e  t r a j e c t o r i e s  f o r  f u n c t i o n a l  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n c l u s i o n s .  J. D i f f .  Eq. 42, 1-24 
HADDAD, G . ,  1981b. Monotone t r a j e c t o r i e s  of  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n c l u -  
s i o n s  and f o n c t i o n a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  i n c l u s i o n s  w i t h  memory J. Math. 
39,  83 - 100. 
HILDENBRAND, W . ,  1974, Core and e q u i l i b r i a  o f  a l a r g e  economy 
( P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  P r i n c e t o n ,  N J ) .  
FAN, Ky, 1968, A minimax i n e q u a l i t y  and a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  i n  : 0 
S h i s h i a ,  ed .  I n e q u a l i t i e s  I11 (Academic P r e s s ,  N e w  York) .  
ROBINSON, S. ,  1976, R e g u l a r i t y  and s t a b i l i t y  f o r  convex m u l t i -  
va lued  f u n c t i o n s ,  Mathematics o f  Ope ra t i ons  Research 1 ,  130-143. 
ROCKAFELLAR, R.T., 1967, Monotone p r o c e s s e s  of  convex and concave 
t y p e ,  American Mathemat ica l  S o c i e t y  memoir n o .  77. 
ROCKAFELLAR, R.T., 1970, Convex a n a l y s i s  ( P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  
P r e s s ,  P r i n c e t o n ,  N J )  . 
ROCKAFELLAR, R.T., 1978, La t h e o r i e  d e s  sous -g r ad i en t s  e t  ses 
a p p l i c a t i o n s  Ei l ' o p t i m i s a t i o n  ( U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Montrea l  P r e s s ,  
Mont rea l )  . 
SHAPLEY, L.S., 1953, A v a l u e  f o r  n  p e r s o n  games, i n  : H.W. Kuhn 
and A.W. Tucker ,  e d s . ,  C o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  games 
( P r i n c e t o n  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s ,  P r i n c e t o n ,  N J ) .  
URSESCU, C . ,  1975, M u l t i f u n c t i o n s  w i t h  c l o s e d  convex g r a p h ,  
Czechoslovakian  Mathemat ica l  J o u r n a l  25, 438-491. 
